Lujo virus is a novel Old World arenavirus identified in Southern Africa in 2008 as the cause of a viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) characterized by nosocomial transmission with a high case fatality rate of 80% (4/5 cases). Whereas this outbreak was limited, the unprecedented Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa, and recent Zika virus disease epidemic in the Americas, has brought into acute focus the need for preparedness to respond to rare but potentially highly pathogenic outbreaks of zoonotic or arthropod-borne viral infections. A key determinant for effective control of a VHF outbreak is the time between primary infection and diagnosis of the index case. Here, we review the Lujo VHF outbreak of 2008 and discuss how preparatory measures with respect to developing diagnostic capacity might be effectively embedded into existing national disease control networks, such as those for human immunodeficiency virus, tuberculosis, and malaria.
Several outbreaks of VHF in humans are recorded each year globally. 3 With the glaring exception of the recent Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West Africa, VHF outbreaks are typically small, limited to less than 100 patients. The median number of patients for the 17 previous EVD outbreaks is 65. 4 Possibly due to the generally limited size of outbreaks, viruses associated with VHF have not been considered a priority for research funding. Consequently, existing diagnostics and therapeutics are limited, as is our understanding of the epidemiology, transmission, and animal reservoirs for some of these viruses.
However, the recent EVD epidemic in West Africa has shown that VHF outbreaks can occur where least expected (eg, West Africa, whereas most previous outbreaks were in Central Africa) 4, 5 and can rapidly spread out of control. As of February 28, 2016 , the recent West African EVD outbreak had infected nearly 29 000 people, with more than 11 000 deaths. 6 Fragile and under-resourced health systems in these countries were sluggish in identifying the disease and were unable to respond rapidly and comprehensively enough to stop the spread of the disease. 7 The situation was further compounded by an initially slow and uncoordinated international response that has been widely condemned. [8] [9] [10] [11] The unprecedented magnitude of the West African EVD outbreak, along with the significant number of EVD survivors with persistent detectable virus in various body fluids (semen and ocular fluid) after recovering from the disease 12, 13 and/or complications 14 plus the discovery that large numbers of people with no history of VHF are seropositive for Ebola virus, 15, 16 has challenged our previous notions of the acute nature of these viral infections of humans and called to question our previous low-priority categorization of these infections with respect to research and health program funding. A retrospective study from Sierra Leone documented serological evidence for infection with a range of VHF viruses (including Ebola and Marburg) in 2% to 8% of patients using acute phase sera from Lassa virus negative febrile patients (collected October [2006] [2007] [2008] , suggesting that there could be Ebola and Marburg infections that are not characterized by rampant human-to-human transmission, 17 similar to the established endemic nature of viruses like Dengue virus, Lassa virus, Hantavirus, 18 and Rift Valley fever virus. 19, 20 As of 2016 the EVD epidemic is no longer out of control, but flare-ups continue: on March 17 Sierra Leone declared an end to a flare-up that started in January, yet on the very same day, a new patient was confirmed in Guinea leading to 5 deaths as of March 24, 2016 , prompting Liberia to close their shared border. This experience emphasizes the need to develop regional and national research networks to better understand the underlying causes of these outbreaks.
Lujo virus (LUJV) was discovered after an outbreak of VHF in Lusaka (Zambia) and Johannesburg (South Africa) in 2008 ( Figure 1) and was the first novel VHF-causing virus to be identified in Africa since the discovery of Ebola virus in 1976. 21, 22 local clinic on September 27, but when seen as an outpatient at her local hospital 6 days later (3 days after the VHF alert and contact tracing commenced), she was initiated on therapy for tuberculosis (TB). She was admitted 2 days later, at which point the contact tracing team made contact with her, and she was referred to the teaching hospital for treatment.
Patient 5 was a 47-year-old white female who also worked in the intensive care unit and had contact with patient 2 (but not with the index case), just 2 days before the VHF alert was raised. There were noted lapses in personal protection, but fortunately by the time she fell ill she was known to the contact tracing team, and ribavirin was administered on day 2 of her illness based on suspected VHF. After being given ribavirin, patient 5 became seriously ill needing mechanical ventilation, but gradually recovered and was discharged after 42 days in hospital. She suffered prolonged neurological sequelae for up to 6 months after discharge from hospital. 24 The clinical presentation and course of Lujo VHF was quite consistent across all 4 fatal patients, starting with myalgia, headache, and fever, followed by onset of rash and pharyngitis on days 4 and 5.
Vomiting and diarrhea were present from days 3 to 7, and then the condition deteriorated with thrombocytopenia and elevated transaminases, severe neurological symptoms, hemodynamic collapse, and death. 24 Patient 5 received many of the same treatments as patients 1 to 4, with the key differences that might have contributed to her survival being prompt initiation of treatment with ribavirin, recombinant factor VIIa, N-acetylcysteine, and atorvastatin. 24 
| OLD WORLD AND NEW WORLD ARENAVIRUSES
The family Arenaviridae consists of 2 genera, Mammarenavirus and Reptarenavirus, which infect mammals and reptiles, respectively. arenavirus that is known to be pathogenic in humans, along with Lassa fever virus and lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (Table 1) , studies utilizing modern molecular tools including next generation sequencing technology are rapidly identifying new arenaviruses in rodent hosts. 27 Epidemiologically, the assumption is that these viruses are generally well adapted to their rodent hosts, and those that might be pathogenic have been shown in vitro to facilitate cell entry. 30 The primary receptor for NW arenaviruses is transferin receptor 1 (TfR1), which is widely distributed and would facilitate a broad cell tropism, 31 and there is in vitro evidence that even a single mutation can confer tropism to human cells. 32 
| SEARCHING FOR THE LUJO VIRUS RESERVOIR HOST
There have been 2 studies aimed at finding the natural animal host of LUJV and to more broadly investigate the prevalence and molecular epidemiology of arenaviruses in rodents and small mammals in Zambia. 33, 34 Combining data from both studies, arenaviruses were Figure 2 ) and sequence identities (Table 2) suggest these events have been followed by significant divergence. When analyzing only a tiny fraction of the total number of quasi species in existence, more conserved regions might masquerade as evidence of recombination using some analysis tools. 39 As indicated in Table 2, the viral nucleoprotein appears to be more conserved than the other coevolved with their rodent hosts, the phylogenetic evidence suggests that the natural host of LUJV should also be a rodent. 35 It might be a rare species, or one that is rarely in contact with human settlement, and/or transmission to humans might require a vector such as a tick, which might explain the possible requirement for the presence of other domestic animals such as horses. While the main route of arenavirus transmission is through contact with urine or feces, the Tacaribe virus was purportedly isolated from mosquitoes as well as bats and has recently been detected in ticks. 41 The physicians who attended the index case of Lujo VHF in South Africa recorded what they thought could be a potential tick bite on the patient's foot. 24 Although this may be coincidental, future surveillance of ticks and mosquitoes for novel RNA viruses is possibly warranted, particularly in light of the recent ZIKV disease outbreak in the Americas 42 and a recent next generation sequencing study of mosquitoes in China identified multiple novel flaviviruses. 43 
| WHAT LIMITED THE LUJO VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVER OUTBREAK?
There are several features of the LUJV outbreak that may have contributed to the limited spread of the virus: the index case was relatively wealthy, living on a peri-urban farm, and seeking care in a small private hospital. For this reason she had minimal contact with other people while she was ill. Also, human-to-human transmission of LUJV appears to occur in the late stages of the infection, maybe during the last 3 days before death, 24 a likely smaller window of transmission compared with EVD. 44 While the 2008 outbreak did not spread to urban populations, in a possible future scenario, an infected individual could travel to crowded urban centers, dramatically increasing the risk of uncontainable spread. At the private hospital involved in the LUJV outbreak, the level of awareness for possible VHF was low, 24 and without intervention this is likely also to be the case at over-crowded government clinics that serve poor communities in Lusaka. Health-seeking behavior may involve visiting traditional healers that would also delay diagnosis, as documented in West Africa during the recent EVD epidemic. 45 Zambia's high burden of human immunodeficiency virus/TB, malnutrition, and other diseases of poverty could also impact on the size and impact of a future outbreak. Taking all these factors into consideration, it would be dangerously complacent to think that the magnitude and spread of a potential future LUJV outbreak will be similar to that of 2008. gives local and international health officials the confirmation they need to mobilize a comprehensive infection control response. Having functional molecular diagnostic capacity nationally or regionally is key to the control of future VHF outbreaks.
| LUJO VIRUS DIAGNOSTIC PREPAREDNESS
The first consideration for laboratory diagnosis of highly pathogenic viruses is biological safety. History has shown that laboratories are high-risk environments, 49 and there needs to be a comprehensive plan and standard operation procedures in place, to ensure worker safety and outbreak prevention. VHF viruses are BSL-4 pathogens, but due to the cost of construction and maintenance, these facilities are available at just a few centers and are primarily required for infecting cell culture or culturing dangerous pathogens. For diagnosis in the field or at a national reference laboratory, the West African EVD outbreak has led to well-established protocols for "relatively" safe collection of specimens and specimen handling for molecular diagnosis, 50 with emphasis and training on appropriate personal protective equipment and specimen handling techniques. Importantly, these safety measures need to be applied to specimens collected from any contacts of the index case, before the specific etiological agent is confirmed. For known VHF pathogens there are more molecular diagnostic assays becoming available. 48 WHO recently approved 6 new rapid Plans are being drawn up to invest in next generation sequencing technology, through the new Illumina MiniSeq and/or Oxford Nanopore minION sequencer, the latter of which has already been used in the field to study the molecular epidemiology of Ebola. 53 In the absence of suspected VHF patients, these technologies will be actively used for research projects on other infectious disease priorities, building the human resource capacity to offer rapid pathogen identification services in the event of future VHF or respiratory virus outbreaks. 
